Quantum string commitment (QSC) schemes were introduced in [BCH + 05]. Let Alice be the committer. Let ρ x be the state of Bob's qubits at the end of the commit phase of an honest run of a QSC protocol when Alice commits x ∈ {0, 1} n . Letp x be the maximum probability with which a cheating Alice can reveal x. Let a = log xp x .
Introduction
Commitment schemes are powerful cryptographic primitives. Strong negative results are known about bit commitment schemes. Quantum string commitment schemes were introduced in [BCH + 05] . In a string commitment protocol there are two mistrustful parties, say Alice and Bob. Alice tries to first commit a string to Bob, so that Bob does not get to know the string and Alice cannot change it. At a later time Alice is supposed to give reveal information to Bob so that he can get to know the string. In commitment schemes, often some trade-off is also allowed between the degrees of concealment and bindingness of the protocol. Let us below formally define a QSC scheme [BCH + • (Binding) For any cheating strategy of Alice, x∈{0,1} npx ≤ 2 a wherep x is the probability that Alice is able to successfully reveal x ∈ {0, 1} n at the reveal stage.
We show the following no-go result about QSCs. As stated in the abstract our results are both stronger and weaker in some sense to the results of [BCH + 05].
Theorem 1.1 1. Every (n, a, b) − χ − QSC scheme with a + 32b + 58 < n is impossible where b is the Holevo information considered under the uniform distribution.
If the set of states {ρ x } satisfy the additional requirement that for all ensembles, E
= {p x , ρ x }, obtained by varying p x and the fixed ρ x , χ(E) ≤ b then ∀x,p x ≥ 2 −32b−58 .
Remark: A result corresponding to 2. above is not mentioned in [BCH + 05] and is new.
It is easily seen that the above parameters, up to constants are achieved by trivial protocols. For result 1. above consider the following protocol. Alice in the concealing phase sends the first b bits of the n-bit string x. Hence Bob gets to know b bits of Holevo-information about x. In the reveal phase a cheating Alice can now reveal any of the 2 n−b x (consistent with the first b bits being the ones sent) with probability 1. For result 2. above let Alice send one of the 2 b strings uniformly to Bob representing the first b bits of x. The condition for result 2. is satisfied. Now if in the reveal phase she wants to commit any x, she can do so with probability 2 −b (in the event that the sent bits are consistent with x).
In the next section we state some quantum information theoretic facts that will be useful in our proof of the no-go result which we prove in section 3.
Preliminaries
For a linear operator A let |A| = √ A † A. Given a quantum state ρ, the von-Neumann entropy of ρ is defined as S(ρ) ∆ = Trρ log ρ. Given two quantum states ρ, σ the relative entropy between them is defined as S(ρ||σ) ∆ = Trρ(log ρ − log σ). Given a state ρ ∈ H and a pure state |φ ∈ H ⊗ K, we call |φ a purification of ρ iff Tr K |φ φ| = ρ.
Definition 2.1 The Holevo χ quantity (or Holevo information) of an ensemble
The following fact follows from the definitions:
Fact 2.1 For an ensemble
We make a central use the following information-theoretic result called the substate theorem due to Jain, Radhakrishnan, and Sen [JRS02] . , [JRS02] ) Let H, K be two finite dimensional Hilbert spaces and dim(K) ≥ dim(H). Let C 2 denote the two dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let ρ, σ be density matrices in H such that S(ρ σ) < ∞. Let |ρ be a purification of ρ in H ⊗ K. Then, for r > 1, there exist pure states |φ , |θ ∈ H ⊗ K and |σ ∈ H ⊗ K ⊗ C 2 , depending on r, such that |σ is a purification of σ and Tr(|ρ ρ| − |φ φ|) ≤ 2 √ r
Fact 2.2 (Substate theorem
, where
We also need the following facts: 
Fact 2.4 ([Jai05])
Let X be a finite set. Let {ρ x : x ∈ X} be a set of states. Let for all ensemble
Fact 2.5 ([NC00]) Given two quantum states ρ and σ, the probability of distinguishing them is at most
Tr|ρ−σ| 2 .
Proof of impossibility
Proof: Part 1. Let us consider a QSC scheme in which in an honest run of the protocol the state of Bob at the end of the conceal phase when Alice commits x is ρ x . Let E = {1/2 n , ρ x }. Let χ(E) ≤ b. Consider a cheating run of the protocol by Alice in which she starts with the superposition x 1/2 n |x in the register where she keeps the commit string. Let |ψ be the entire pure state of Alice and Bob at the end of the commit phase. We note that in this case the state of Bob's qubits is ρ. Let |ψ x be the purification of ρ obtained from Fact 2.2. Since the reduced quantum state on Bob's part in both |ψ x and |ψ is the same, from local transition theorem there exists a transformation acting only in Alice's side which takes |ψ to |ψ x . If Alice wants to commit some x she applies this transformation which transforms |ψ to |ψ x and then she measures the first bit. If she obtains 1 then she goes ahead with the rest of the reveal information.
In case she succeeds let the state with Bob be ρ ′
from Fact 2.5 Bob will not be able to differentiate between the two cases with probability more than 1/ √ r. Hence probability of successp x for Alice is at least (1 − 1/ √ r)(1 − 1/r)2 −rk where k = 8S(ρ x ||ρ) + 14. We put r = 4 and getp ≥ 2 −32S(ρx||ρ)−58 . Hence
≥ 2 n 2 −32b−58 = 2 n−32b−58
The second inequality comes from the convexity of the exponential function and the third inequality comes from Fact 2.1. Part 2 Let µ = {q x } be the distribution on {0, 1} n obtained from Fact 2.4. Consider a similar cheating strategy of Alice in which she puts the superposition x √ q x |x in the register where she keeps the commit string. Now by arguments as above probability of successp x for Alice is at least (1 − 1/ √ r)(1 − 1/r)2 −rk where k = 8S(ρ x ||ρ) + 14. Since for all x, S(ρ x ||ρ) ≤ b it implies (by putting r = 4) ∀x,p x ≥ 2 −32b−58
